By Barr. Joseph Uchenna Amadi, LL.B (Hons), B.L, Notary Public, MSc Project Management
Introduction
The recent decision of the Federal High Court, Lokoja Judicial Division, setting aside its earlier judgment which compelled the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to register the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), has generated intense legal and political discourse within Nigeria’s constitutional democracy.
The controversy is rooted in Suit No. FHC/LKJ/CS/49/2025, instituted by Barr. Takori Mohammed Sani, Barr. Ikenna Morgan Enekweizu, Hon. Abdulmumin Ohiare Abdulsalami and Pius Ugboja, suing on behalf of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) against the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In a judgment delivered on 10 December 2025, Hon. Justice Isa H. Dashen held that INEC’s refusal to register the NDC on account of an alleged similarity between its logo and that of another political association was unjustifiable and inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association under Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Court consequently directed INEC to register the NDC, and INEC complied.
However, on 26 June 2026, the same Court set aside its earlier judgment on the ground that the Peace Movement Party (PMP), which allegedly claimed ownership of the disputed logo, had not been joined in the earlier proceedings. The Court held that the failure to join the PMP amounted to a denial of fair hearing and ordered that the matter be heard afresh with the NDC, INEC and PMP joined as parties.
With profound respect, the later decision raises fundamental constitutional questions regarding the doctrine of functus officio, judicial finality, the distinction between void and voidable judgments, and the proper limits of a trial court’s jurisdiction.
The Earlier Judgment Rendered the Court Functus Officio
The doctrine of functus officio is one of the cardinal principles of judicial administration. It simply means that once a court has performed its judicial duty by finally determining the rights of parties before it, it lacks jurisdiction to reopen the merits of that decision except in narrowly recognised circumstances.
The Supreme Court emphatically stated this principle in Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.109) 250, where it held that once a court has delivered its final judgment, it cannot sit on appeal over that judgment. The only recognised exceptions are the correction of accidental slips, clerical mistakes, or where the judgment is shown to be a nullity for fundamental jurisdictional reasons.
Similarly, in Chief Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR 372, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigation must come to an end and that a court cannot review its own final judgment merely because another view of the matter is possible.
Likewise, First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. TSA Industries Ltd. (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt.1216) 247 reiterates that judicial finality is indispensable to the administration of justice and that review of a final judgment belongs, in the ordinary course, to an appellate court.
In the instant case, the Federal High Court had not only delivered judgment in Suit No. FHC/LKJ/CS/49/2025, but INEC had fully implemented the judgment by registering the NDC. The rights created by that judgment had therefore crystallised. It is respectfully arguable that, upon delivering and perfecting that judgment, the Court became functus officio.
*Did Non-Joinder of the Peace Movement Party Render the Earlier Judgment a Nullity?*
The principal justification for setting aside the earlier judgment was that the Peace Movement Party (PMP), which allegedly had an interest in the disputed logo, was not joined in the proceedings.
Undoubtedly, the right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36(1) of the Constitution is fundamental. Equally, the law recognises the necessity of joining parties whose legal interests may be directly affected by judicial proceedings.
In Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 480, the Supreme Court held that all persons whose rights may be affected by the outcome of litigation should ordinarily be joined. Similarly, Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC 1 underscores the importance of proper joinder.
However, the more fundamental question is whether the omission of a party automatically rendered the earlier judgment void, thereby empowering the same court to revisit its final decision.
The Supreme Court in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 drew a clear distinction between a court acting without jurisdiction and a court committing an error while exercising jurisdiction. Where a court possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties before it, not every procedural defect renders its proceedings a nullity.
Consequently, there is a respectable legal argument that if the complaint was essentially one of non-joinder, the proper remedy ought to have been an appeal rather than inviting the same trial court to review its own final judgment.
*The Proper Constitutional Remedy Was an Appeal*
Nigeria’s constitutional architecture establishes a clear hierarchy of courts. By virtue of Sections 240 and 241 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal exercises appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the Federal High Court.
The appellate process exists precisely because trial courts are not constitutionally empowered to review the correctness of their own final judgments.
If every allegation of denial of fair hearing or non-joinder were sufficient to revive the jurisdiction of a court that had already become functus officio, the doctrine itself would lose all practical significance.
As the Supreme Court observed in Rossek v. ACB Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.312) 382, inherent jurisdiction cannot be employed to enlarge the constitutional jurisdiction of a court.
*Political Party Registration and Constitutional Democracy*
Political parties are indispensable institutions in Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. Sections 40, 221 and 222 of the Constitution protect the right of citizens to form and participate in political associations, subject only to constitutional and statutory requirements.
In INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt.806) 72, the Supreme Court held that constitutional rights relating to political association cannot be subjected to arbitrary administrative restrictions. The Court reaffirmed that the democratic process must be interpreted in favour of political participation rather than unnecessary exclusion.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227 reaffirmed that the rule of law must prevail over political expediency and that constitutional rights within the electoral process deserve robust judicial protection.
Once INEC complied with the judgment of 10 December 2025 by registering the NDC, legal rights accrued to the party. Those rights ought not to be disturbed except through the constitutionally recognised appellate process or upon a clear demonstration that the earlier judgment was a nullity in law.
*Conclusion*
In my respectful opinion, the stronger legal argument supports the proposition that the Federal High Court became functus officio upon delivering its final judgment in Suit No. FHC/LKJ/CS/49/2025, which was subsequently implemented by INEC through the registration of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC).
While the constitutional right to fair hearing remains sacrosanct, the authorities suggest that not every allegation of non-joinder automatically renders a judgment void. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties before it, an error in the exercise of that jurisdiction ordinarily renders the decision voidable rather than void, with the proper remedy lying before the Court of Appeal.
Ultimately, the final determination of the legality of the Federal High Court’s decision of 26 June 2026 rests with the appellate courts. Nevertheless, the controversy underscores the enduring importance of the doctrines of functus officio, judicial finality, constitutional certainty and respect for the hierarchy of courts. These principles are not mere procedural technicalities; they are indispensable safeguards of the rule of law and public confidence in the administration of justice.
